Incident Response

Incident Response Playbook: 72-Hour Breach Response Guide

Lars Schmidt
January 10, 2025
19 min read
Incident ResponseDigital ForensicsSOCBreach Response

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Incident Response Playbook: 72-Hour Breach Response Guide

Author: Yuki Tanaka, GCIH, GCFA, GREM | Last Updated: October 18, 2025

Executive Summary

The first 72 hours after detecting a security incident are critical. Organizations with a documented incident response plan contain breaches 54 days faster and save an average of €1.23M in breach costs (IBM Cost of Data Breach Report 2024).

After responding to 300+ security incidents including ransomware, data breaches, and APT campaigns, we've refined this playbook to provide clear, actionable guidance for the most critical phase of any security incident.

Key Statistics:

  • Average time to identify breach: 204 days
  • Average time to contain breach: 73 days
  • Cost of breaches <200 days: €3.61M
  • Cost of breaches >200 days: €4.88M
  • Speed matters!

Hour 0-1: Detection & Initial Response

Incident Detection Triggers

Common Detection Methods:

  1. Security Tools (45%)

    • SIEM alerts
    • EDR detections
    • IDS/IPS alerts
    • DLP violations
  2. User Reports (32%)

    • "My computer is acting strange"
    • "I can't access my files" (ransomware)
    • Suspicious emails
  3. Third-Party Notification (15%)

    • Law enforcement
    • Partner/customer notice
    • Security researcher
  4. Routine Audit (8%)

    • Log review
    • Penetration test findings

Immediate Actions (First 60 Minutes)

Step 1: Confirm the Incident (5 minutes)

VALIDATION CHECKLIST:
β–‘ Is this a real security incident or false positive?
β–‘ What is the indicator of compromise (IoC)?
β–‘ Which systems/data are affected?
β–‘ Is the threat still active?

Examples:
βœ… REAL: Ransomware encryption in progress
βœ… REAL: Unauthorized access to database
βœ… REAL: Data exfiltration detected
❌ FALSE: Authorized pen-test activity
❌ FALSE: Known security tool behavior

Step 2: Activate Incident Response Team (10 minutes)

Core IRT Members:

  • Incident Commander: Overall coordination (CISO or designee)
  • Technical Lead: Forensics, containment (SOC Manager)
  • Communications: Internal/external messaging (PR/Legal)
  • Legal Counsel: Regulatory obligations, liability
  • Management: Executive decisions, resource allocation

Notification Template:

TO: incident-response@company.com
SUBJECT: [CRITICAL] Security Incident Declared - IRT Activation

Incident ID: INC-2025-1142
Severity: HIGH
Declared: 2025-11-02 14:35 CET
Declared by: John Smith, SOC Analyst

INITIAL ASSESSMENT:
Ransomware detected on file server FS-01. Approximately 500GB 
encrypted. Attack ongoing. Multiple workstations also affected.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS REQUIRED:
1. Join war room: https://teams.microsoft.com/...
2. Review incident dashboard: https://dashboard.company.com/inc/1142
3. Standby for assignments

Next update: 30 minutes
Incident Commander: Jane Doe, CISO

Step 3: Preserve Evidence (Ongoing)

# Capture volatile data BEFORE shutting down
# Memory dump
sudo lime-acquire /dev/sda1 /mnt/evidence/server01.mem

# Network connections
netstat -anp > /mnt/evidence/netstat.txt
ss -tulpn > /mnt/evidence/ss.txt

# Running processes
ps aux > /mnt/evidence/processes.txt
top -b -n 1 > /mnt/evidence/top.txt

# Timeline
date > /mnt/evidence/timeline.txt
last -F >> /mnt/evidence/timeline.txt

# Hash evidence files
sha256sum /mnt/evidence/* > /mnt/evidence/CHECKSUMS.txt

# Document chain of custody
echo "Collected by: John Smith" >> /mnt/evidence/custody.txt
echo "Date: $(date)" >> /mnt/evidence/custody.txt

Critical: Work with forensic copies, never original evidence!


Hour 1-4: Containment

Containment Strategies

Short-Term Containment (Immediate):

Option 1: Network Isolation

# Isolate infected host (preserve for forensics)
# Firewall block (AWS example)
aws ec2 revoke-security-group-ingress \
  --group-id sg-12345 \
  --ip-permissions file://revoke-all.json

# Disconnect from network (physical/virtual)
# PRESERVE POWER - do not shut down yet!

Option 2: Account Disable

# Compromised user account
# Azure AD
az ad user update --id user@company.com --account-enabled false

# AWS IAM
aws iam update-login-profile --user-name compromised-user --password-reset-required

# Revoke all sessions
aws iam delete-access-key --user-name compromised-user --access-key-id AKIA...

Option 3: Service Shutdown

# Stop affected service (if safe to do so)
systemctl stop apache2

# Database read-only mode
mysql> SET GLOBAL read_only = ON;

# Kill malicious process
kill -9 $(ps aux | grep malware.exe | awk '{print $2}')

Long-Term Containment (Within 24 hours):

  • Rebuild compromised systems from clean backups
  • Patch vulnerabilities that enabled initial access
  • Implement additional monitoring
  • Update security controls

Containment Decision Matrix

Incident TypeIsolationAccount DisableService StopForensic Image
Ransomwareβœ… Immediateβœ… Yes⚠️ If possibleβœ… Before wipe
Data Breachβœ… Yesβœ… Yes❌ No (preserve logs)βœ… Yes
Phishing❌ Noβœ… Victim accounts❌ No⚠️ Email server logs
Malwareβœ… Yes⚠️ If credential theft⚠️ Dependsβœ… Yes
DDoS❌ No❌ No⚠️ Rate limiting❌ No

Hour 4-24: Investigation & Eradication

Forensic Investigation

Timeline Analysis:

# Linux: Combine all relevant logs
cat /var/log/auth.log /var/log/syslog /var/log/apache2/access.log | \
  sort | grep -E "Failed|Accepted|GET|POST" > timeline.txt

# Windows: PowerShell event log extraction
Get-EventLog -LogName Security -After (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) | \
  Where-Object {$_.EventID -eq 4625} | # Failed logins
  Export-Csv failed-logins.csv

Malware Analysis:

# Isolate sample
cp /tmp/suspicious.exe /evidence/malware/sample.exe

# Hash
sha256sum /evidence/malware/sample.exe
a3f8b9c2d1e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0

# Check VirusTotal
curl --request POST \
  --url 'https://www.virustotal.com/api/v3/files' \
  --header 'x-apikey: YOUR_API_KEY' \
  --form 'file=@/evidence/malware/sample.exe'

# Dynamic analysis (sandboxed environment only!)
# Use ANY.RUN, Joe Sandbox, or Cuckoo Sandbox

Indicator of Compromise (IoC) Collection:

# IoC Format (STIX/TAXII compatible)
iocs:
  file_hashes:
    - type: SHA256
      value: a3f8b9c2d1e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0
      context: Ransomware payload
  
  ip_addresses:
    - value: 185.220.102.8
      type: C2 server
      asn: AS51167 (Tor exit node)
    
  domains:
    - value: evil-command.xyz
      type: C2 domain
      first_seen: 2025-11-01
  
  registry_keys:
    - path: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\UpdateTask
      value: C:\ProgramData\malware.exe
  
  urls:
    - value: hxxp://185.220.102.8:8080/beacon
      type: Beacon URL

Threat Intelligence:

# Query threat feeds
# AlienVault OTX
curl -X GET "https://otx.alienvault.com/api/v1/indicators/IPv4/185.220.102.8/general" \
  -H "X-OTX-API-KEY: YOUR_KEY"

# MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform)
# Check if IoCs match known campaigns

# VirusTotal retrohunt
# Search for similar malware samples

Root Cause Analysis

5 Whys Technique:

Incident: Ransomware encrypted file server

Why 1: How did ransomware get on file server?
β†’ Via admin workstation with RDP connection

Why 2: How did ransomware get on admin workstation?
β†’ User clicked malicious email attachment

Why 3: Why did email attachment execute?
β†’ Email gateway didn't block .zip with .exe inside

Why 4: Why didn't EDR block execution?
β†’ EDR policy in "monitor only" mode on admin workstations

Why 5: Why was EDR not in enforcement mode?
β†’ No policy requiring EDR enforcement for all endpoints

ROOT CAUSE: Inadequate endpoint protection policy
FIX: Mandatory EDR enforcement + email filtering enhancement

Eradication

Malware Removal:

# Remove malicious files
rm -f /tmp/malware.exe
rm -f /var/tmp/.hidden-backdoor

# Kill processes
pkill -9 -f malware

# Remove persistence
crontab -e  # Remove malicious cron jobs
vi /etc/rc.local  # Remove startup scripts

# Windows: Remove registry persistence
reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v MaliciousTask /f

Credential Reset:

# Force password reset for all affected accounts
# Azure AD
az ad user list --query "[].userPrincipalName" -o tsv | \
  xargs -I {} az ad user update --id {} --force-change-password-next-login true

# Revoke all active sessions
az ad signed-in-user list-owned-objects | # Identify logged-in users
  # Force re-authentication

Patch Vulnerabilities:

# Apply emergency patches
apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y  # Linux
# Or use patch management tools (WSUS, SCCM, AWS Systems Manager)

# Disable vulnerable services
systemctl disable vsftpd  # If FTP was attack vector
systemctl stop vsftpd

Hour 24-72: Recovery & Restoration

Recovery Steps

1. Validate Clean State

# Full system scan
clamscan -r / --infected --remove

# Rootkit check
rkhunter --check
chkrootkit

# Integrity verification
aide --check  # Compare against baseline

# Network traffic analysis
tcpdump -i eth0 -w recovery-traffic.pcap
# Analyze for any C2 beaconing

2. Restore from Backups

# Verify backup integrity
sha256sum backup.tar.gz
# Compare with original hash

# Restore (to isolated environment first!)
tar -xzf backup.tar.gz -C /mnt/restore/

# Scan restored files
clamscan -r /mnt/restore/

# If clean, restore to production
rsync -avz /mnt/restore/ /production/

3. Phased Service Restoration

PHASE 1 (Hour 24-36): Critical Systems
β–‘ Authentication (AD, IAM)
β–‘ Email (with enhanced filtering)
β–‘ Core business applications

PHASE 2 (Hour 36-48): Important Systems
β–‘ File servers (from clean backups)
β–‘ Databases (validated clean)
β–‘ Internal tools

PHASE 3 (Hour 48-72): Standard Systems
β–‘ Development environments
β–‘ Test systems
β–‘ Non-critical applications

VALIDATION AT EACH PHASE:
βœ… No malware detected
βœ… Logs show normal activity
βœ… Performance metrics normal
βœ… No IOCs detected

Communication & Reporting

Internal Communications

Stakeholder Updates:

Every 4 hours during active incident:

TO: Executive Leadership
SUBJECT: Incident Update - Hour 28

SITUATION:
Ransomware incident affecting 12 file servers. Containment 
complete. No evidence of data exfiltration. Beginning recovery 
from backups.

ACTIONS TAKEN:
βœ… Isolated all infected systems
βœ… Disabled 45 compromised accounts
βœ… Applied emergency patches
βœ… Engaged forensics partner (Mandiant)

CURRENT STATUS:
- Services Down: File shares, backup system
- Services Operational: Email, web applications, customer portal
- ETA for file share restoration: 18 hours
- No customer data impacted

DECISIONS NEEDED:
- Approve €180,000 for forensics investigation
- Approve overtime for IT team (next 72 hours)

Next update: 16:00 CET
Incident Commander: Jane Doe

External Communications

Regulatory Notification (NIS2, GDPR):

TO: Belgian Data Protection Authority
SUBJECT: Data Breach Notification - Initial Report

Reporting Entity: ATLAS Advisory SE
Incident ID: INC-2025-1142
Report Type: Initial (24-hour)

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION:
Ransomware attack detected 2025-11-02 14:35 CET. File servers 
encrypted. Investigation ongoing.

SUSPECTED CAUSE:
Malicious email attachment leading to ransomware deployment.

CROSS-BORDER IMPACT:
Potentially yes - file servers contain client data from BE, DE, FR.

DATA SUBJECTS AFFECTED:
Under investigation. Estimated: 500-2,000 individuals.
Categories: Client contact information, project files.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:
- Isolated affected systems
- Engaged forensics team
- Notifying potentially affected clients
- Password resets enforced

NEXT STEPS:
Detailed report within 72 hours.

Contact: dpo@atlas-advisory.eu / +32 2 XXX XXXX
Date: 2025-11-02 18:30 CET

Customer Notification:

SUBJECT: Important Security Notice

Dear [Customer Name],

We are writing to inform you of a security incident that may have 
affected your data.

WHAT HAPPENED:
On November 2, 2025, we detected and contained a ransomware attack 
affecting our file storage systems. We immediately isolated the 
affected systems and engaged cybersecurity experts to investigate.

WHAT INFORMATION WAS INVOLVED:
Our investigation is ongoing. Files that may have been accessed include:
- Contact information (names, email addresses, phone numbers)
- Project documentation from [Date Range]

We have found NO EVIDENCE of data exfiltration at this time.

WHAT WE ARE DOING:
βœ“ Contained the incident within 4 hours
βœ“ Engaged leading cybersecurity forensics firm
βœ“ Restored systems from clean backups
βœ“ Enhanced security monitoring
βœ“ Notified relevant authorities

WHAT YOU SHOULD DO:
- Remain vigilant for phishing emails
- Enable multi-factor authentication on your accounts
- Monitor accounts for suspicious activity
- Contact us with any concerns

FOR MORE INFORMATION:
Visit: https://company.com/security-incident
Email: security@company.com
Phone: +32 2 XXX XXXX (24/7 hotline)

We sincerely apologize for any concern this may cause and are committed 
to protecting your information.

[Company Name]
[Date]

Post-Incident Activities

Lessons Learned (Within 2 Weeks)

Post-Incident Review Meeting:

Attendees: IRT members, management, key stakeholders

Agenda:

  1. Timeline reconstruction
  2. What went well?
  3. What could be improved?
  4. Root cause analysis
  5. Action items

Sample Findings:

INCIDENT: Ransomware via phishing email

WHAT WENT WELL:
βœ… Detection within 30 minutes (EDR alert)
βœ… IRT activated quickly (15 minutes)
βœ… Containment successful (4 hours)
βœ… Backups were clean and restorable
βœ… No data exfiltration

WHAT COULD BE IMPROVED:
❌ Email filtering didn't block attachment (.zip with .exe)
❌ EDR was in "monitor only" mode on some systems
❌ No email authentication training in past 12 months
❌ Incident response plan not tested in 18 months
❌ Backup restoration took 36 hours (too slow)

ACTION ITEMS:
1. Enhance email filtering (owner: IT Manager, due: Nov 15)
2. Enforce EDR on all endpoints (owner: SOC Manager, due: Nov 10)
3. Security awareness training (owner: HR, due: Dec 1)
4. Quarterly IR tabletop exercises (owner: CISO, ongoing)
5. Optimize backup restoration (owner: Infra Lead, due: Nov 30)

Metrics to Track

Response Metrics:

  • Time to detect (TTD)
  • Time to respond (TTR)
  • Time to contain (TTC)
  • Time to recover (MTTR)

Business Impact:

  • Services affected
  • Downtime duration
  • Revenue impact
  • Customer impact
  • Regulatory fines

Cost:

  • Incident response team time
  • External consultants
  • Legal fees
  • Regulatory fines
  • Lost business
  • Reputation damage

Example:

INCIDENT COST BREAKDOWN:

Direct Costs:
- Forensics firm: €85,000
- Legal counsel: €25,000
- Overtime (staff): €18,000
- PR/communications: €12,000
Total Direct: €140,000

Indirect Costs:
- Lost revenue (3 days downtime): €280,000
- Customer churn (estimated): €450,000
- Reputation damage (estimated): €1,200,000
Total Indirect: €1,930,000

TOTAL INCIDENT COST: €2,070,000

Cost Avoidance (due to quick response):
- Prevented data exfiltration: €4,500,000 (estimated)
- Prevented ransomware payment: €500,000 (demanded)
- Prevented longer downtime: €1,200,000
Total Avoided: €6,200,000

NET BENEFIT OF IR PROGRAM: €4,130,000

Incident Response Tools

Essential Tools

Forensics & Analysis:

Malware Analysis:

Threat Intelligence:

Incident Management:


Conclusion

Effective incident response is not optionalβ€”it's a business imperative. Every hour of delay increases breach costs by an average of €45,000.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Prepare: Document IR plan, train team, test regularly
  2. Detect Fast: Invest in monitoring and detection
  3. Contain Quickly: First 4 hours are critical
  4. Investigate Thoroughly: Understand root cause
  5. Communicate Clearly: Internal and external stakeholders
  6. Learn: Post-incident review drives improvement

ATLAS Advisory has responded to 300+ security incidents, containing 94% within 24 hours and preventing an estimated €127M in breach costs.

Need incident response help?
24/7 Emergency Hotline: emergency@atlas-advisory.eu | +32 2 XXX XXXX


Resources

Frameworks & Standards:

Training & Certifications:

  • SANS FOR508: Advanced Incident Response
  • GCIH: GIAC Certified Incident Handler
  • GCFA: GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst
  • EC-Council CHFI: Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator

Related Articles:

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